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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. THE LEHIGH
VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
THE decision of the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission
v. the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, marks anothet stage in the development of a controversy which is being watched with very great interest by business and railroad men throughout the country. 4 It is true
this last decision does not deal with any of the grave constitutional questions which are involved in the case, and that the precise point decided
is not a new one, having been similarly held by Judge JACKSON in the
Kentucky Circuit ;' but, as that point is one of great importance in the
practical 'enforcement of the Act to Regulate Commerce, a new decision
upon it at this time, and in a case of such importance, cannotfail to draw
general attention to certain peculiar features of the act.
This. controversy originated in a complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission by Coxe Brothers & Company, that the railroad company was charging unreasonable rates for the interstate transportation of
anthracite coal. The Commission heard the evidence; and, after holding
the matter under advisement for over two years, came to the conclusion
that the rates in question were unreasonable, and issued an order forbidding the railroad company from making any charges in excess of certain
maximum rates. The railroad company not having complied with this
order, Coxe Brothers & Company petitioned the Commission to take
some steps to secure obedience to their order, and thereupon the Commission,' proceeding under the sixteenth section of the Act as amended, applied by petition to the Circuit Court, sitting in equity, praying for a writ
of injunction, or other proper process, to restrain the railroad company
from further violation of the order. To this petition the railroad company filed an answer, which (beside other defences of a legal character,
which it was not necessary to decide at this stage) denied that the rates
were unreasonable, and averred -thatall the findings of fact by the Commission were erroneous, and were not in accordance with the evidence.
Counsel for the Commission, Simon Sterne, Esq., of New York,
did not file a replication, but put the case down for heaing on petition
and answer, taking the ground that the only questions open for discussion
were questions of law, such as the jurisdiction of the Commission, its
authority to make such an order, and the constitutionality of the Ilw.
He laid stress upon the fact that this was no longer a controversy between Coxe Brothers & Company and the railroad company, but between
the railroad company and the Commission, in which the latter was seeking to enforce its order, and argued that upon all matters of fact which
had arisen in the former proceeding, the findings of the Commission were
conclusive, and such matters of fact were not now open for discussion.
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The Court, however, AcHEs N, J., writing the opinion, having pointed
out that the Act made no distinction between cases in which the petition
was filed by the party interested and those in which it was.filed by the
Commission, refused to acquiesce in the above view, and directed the
Commission to file a replication, holding that it was plainly the intention
of the Act that the findings of the Commission should be primafade
evidence only, and that the language of the sixteenth section showed
clearly that it was the duty of the Court to form an independent judgment, which it could only do after hearing all the evidence, including,
besides that contained in the report of the Commission, any additional
evidence that might be produced by either party. An analysis of this
section shows that there can be no doubt as to the correctness of this
view. The Court, upon a petition alleging the violation of a "lawful order," is to proceed to "hear and determine the matter," "as a court of
equity," "in such manner as to do justice in the premises," and to this
end it may prosecute, in such mode and by such persons as it may appoint, all needful "inquiries" to enable itto "form a just judgment" in
the matter of the petition; and finally, "on such hearing, the findings of
fact in the report of said Commission shall be primJafacie evidence of
the matters therein stated."
If this be the state of the law, one may perhaps be permitted to ask
of what practical utility is the Commission? Judge JACKSON says: "In
-respect to interstate commerce matters covered by the law, the Commission may be regarded as the general referee of each and every Circuit
Court of the United States upon which the jurisdiction is conferred of
enforcing the rights, duties and obligations imposed under the Act."
But this can only be so to a very qualified extent, for the same learned
Judge refused to give to the findings of the Commission the effect of those
of a referee, for he sent the whole case to another referee, who came to
an opposite conclusion, which the Court confirmed. Had the complainant in that case been able to proceed in the Circuit Court in the first instance, it would have been saved the expense of the investigation before
the Commission (in which each party pays his own costs), which was of
really no advantage to it. Indeed, under the present state of the law, an
investigation by the Commission is a mockery and a sham, and fails to
serve any useful purpose. Under the present method, in order to obtain
redress, a complainant must prove his case successively in two separate
tribunals, and if he loses in either, relief is denied him. And even if he
wins before the Commission, he has gained a very slight advantage; for
although a favorable report will be primafacie evidence for him in the
Circuit Court, yet, owing to several circumstances, this does not amount
to much. The respondent is not compelled to show his hand before the
Commission, and may keep back testimony which, when produced for
the first time in the Court, may rebut the primtafacieeffect of the report,
and throw the burden again upon the complainant. Then, the length
of time which is likely to elapse (in the Coxe case nearly three years) between the hearing before the Commission and that in the Court, is of
itself sufficient to discredit a report, especially upon such a subject as the
reasonableness of rates. Nor can a judge who, by the law, is expressly
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required to form an independent judgment, be expected to give very
great weight to the conclusions which other men have arrived at from
an investigation of the same questions into which it is his duty to inquire, especially if he has no particular reason to believe that those men
had any better opportunities for eliciting the truth, or were any better
fitted for forming an opinion.
The above views, if correct, would seem to lead to the conclusion
that either the findings of fact of the Commission should be given the
efficacy of a judgment, or the investigation by the Commission should
be abolished, and an original proceeding before the Circuit Court, or
some special court, substituted. The first proposition involves several
grave constitutional questions which were discussed, but not decided, in
both the above cases, and into a consideration of which it is not here
intended to enter at length, but which may be briefly outlined.
It is perfectly well settled that functions, powers or duties which are
properly embraced within what is called by the Constitution "the judicial power of the United States," can only be exercised by the courts of,
the United States, the judges of which, according to the Constitution, are
to hold office during good behavior. It is quite evident that the Commission is not a court of the United States, for its members hold office
only during stated periods, and there is no requirement, either of law or
usage, that they shall be learned in the law. Judicial functions, therefore, cannot be bestowed upon the Commission. To invest the Commission with power to pass finally upon the reasonableness of rates, etc.,
would undoubtedly be clothing it with judicial functions; for, says the
Supreme Court in Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minnesota,I "the question
of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad
company, involving , as it does, the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for
judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination.
If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for
the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence
of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use
of its property, and thus in substance, and effect of the property itself,
without due process of law, and in violation of the Constitution of the
United States." And the Court accordingly held in that case, that the
statute of Minnesota; which authorized a commission to fix rates and forbade any judicial investigation into the reasonableness of the rates so
fixed, was void; and that decision governs the present question, because
the constitutional provision in regard to due process of law applies to the
United States as well as to the States.
It is quite evident, therefore, that the constitution of the Commission
would have to be changed to correspond to that of a court before it could
be invested with the power of passing finally upon such questions. To
this it maybe said that it would be better to abolish the Commission and
provide for a similar proceeding in the Circuit Court. Though it may be
urged, in support of this view, that the judges of the Circuit Courts, where
1134 U.S., 418.
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they have been called upon to construe the Interstate Commerce Act, or
to decide questions of fact arising thereunder, have shown a grasp of the
subject and an appreciation of the problems equal, if not superior, to that
exhibited by the Commission-which was what might be expected from
men whose whole training has been such as to fit them for the solution of
difficult questions-yet there are compensating disadvantages. The evident reason for the establishment of a permanent Commission, with
jurisdiction over the whole subject of interstate commerce, was the hope
that by that means consistency and uniformity of policy would result,
which it was thought could not be attained in any other way. True, the
attainment of this object has been to a very great extent prevented by
the frequent changes in the Personnel of the Commission, and will be
entirely frustrated if the present method of trying the cases de novo in
the Circuit Courts is to continue; but both these obstacles may be in time
removed. But to transfer this jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts would
make uniformity almost impossible. Just as the Circuit Courts now
frequently come to conclusions quite different froi those reached by the
Commission, after an investigation of the very same facts, so the various
Circuit Courts would be likely to differ from each other; for, in deciding
matters of fact, precedent counts for little, and on questions depending
almost entirely on judgment, courts are always apt to differ. Nor, for
the same reason, would an appeal to a higher tribunal, apart from the
difficulty which would attend such a proceeding in matters of this kind,
be of much avail in securing uniformity.
It would seem, therefore, that the efficient administration of the Act
to Regulate Commerce requires the establishment of one Court, whose
members shall be learned in the law and hold their offices during good
behavior, and which shall have power to hear and determine all matters
of fact arising under that Act. It would not be necessary, or, perhaps,
wise, to give such a Court the power to enforce its own decrees. All that
is needed is one tribunal, in which the evidence shall be produced once
and for all, and which shall have authority to pass finally upon matters
of fact, and possibly also upon mixed matters of fact and law. To this
end the findings of the Court might be given the effect of a verdict of a
jury, or of a judgment of a Court of a sister State, which could be
enforced in the regular judicial tribunals, to whose decision it would, perhaps, be wiser to leave pure questions of law, such as the construction of
the Act, the jurisdiction and authority of the special tribunal, etc. To
give such a Court authority to enforce its own decrees would be open
to the great objection of placing enormous power in the hands of a few
men, and even the proposition to confer upon it the powers above outlined is one which should receive very serious consideration, but into a
discussion of the policy of which it is not our province to enter.
F1RANCIS COPE HARTSHORNE.

